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The Application of Robustness Analysis to the
Conflict With Incomplete Information
Hiroyuki Sakakibara, Member, IEEE, Norio Okada, and Daisuke Nakase
Abstract—When players with different interests try to achieve
a better state, conflicts among players arise. Conflicts may arise
also among public players. For example, a local government may
insist on the interest of the region while the national government
represents the interests of the whole country.
Conflict analysis is one of the methods to model such conflicts
mathematically. Its stability analysis specifies stable states based
on the ordinal information on players’ preferences. However, if the
preference of a player is private, stability of states is not known.
In such a case, players or third parties have to collect additional
information on other players’ preference. It is necessary to specify
the minimum information to collect.
In this paper, graph model for conflict resolution (GMCR) is ex-
tended for the cases with incomplete information. Then, the gen-
eralized robustness analysis is proposed to specify the minimum
conditions for stability of states. Finally, robustness analysis is ap-
plied to the conflict on water resources development.
Index Terms—Conflict with incomplete information, graph
model for conflict resolution (GMCR), robustness analysis,
two-player conflict.
I. INTRODUCTION
FRASER and Hipel [1] proposed conflict analysis basedon metagame theory [2]. Conflict analysis defines stability
of states and specifies stable states. Nash equilibrium in game
theory is one of the concepts of stability. Fang et al. [3] extended
the methodology and proposed graph model for conflict resolu-
tion (GMCR). In GMCR, agents’ moves between states are ex-
tended to include common and irreversible moves.
In order to analyze the stability of states, it is critical to know
the preferences of players. However, it is often difficult to ob-
tain complete information. That is why minimum conditions
for stability should be specified before the inspection of prefer-
ences. Okada et al. [4] proposed robustness analysis to identify
the minimum conditions on players’ preferences in the 2-player
conflicts where one player’s preference is not known to another
player. On the other hand, the third party may not have enough
information on both players’ preferences.
In this paper, robustness analysis is extended to apply to the
graph model for 2-player conflicts where both players’ prefer-
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Fig. 1. Strategic form (upper) and graph form (below) of “prisoners’
dilemma.”
ences are not known each other. In Section II, GMCR is ex-
tended for the cases with incomplete preference information.
In Section III, generalized robustness analysis is proposed. In
Section IV, the methodology of robustness analysis is applied to
the conflict on water resources development.
II. GRAPH MODEL FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION WITH
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
A. Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR)
Fang et al. [3] proposed the GMCR as the representation of
conflicts among players. Let be the set of
players and be the set of states of the con-
flict. We also define -tuple as the set
of directed graphs that . The set of arcs means
player s possible move between states. Let be the arc
from the state to the state . If , player can
move from the state to the state unilaterally. We also need
to define the payoff function : ( : the set of real
numbers). Payoff function determines players’ evaluations of
the state in , and specifies players’ preference orders. If
is larger than , player prefers the state to the state .
GMCR is represented by 4-tuple , where
, , ,
and . Fig. 1 shows both strategic
form and graph form of the “prisoner’s dilemma.” In this case,
, and
, , respectively.
The following are other definitions used in GMCR.
1094-6977/02$17.00 © 2002 IEEE
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Fig. 2. Strategic form (upper) and graph form (below) of formulation of
cooperation.
a) State s reachable list
if player can move unilaterally from the
state to the state ( ).
b) State s unilateral improvement (UI)
if and .
Compared with strategic form, the major advantage of graph
form is that it can represent common and irreversible moves.
The definitions of common and irreversible moves are as
follows.
Definition:
• The move is common move if and
for and .
• The move is irreversible move if and
for .
In strategic form, states are defined as the combination of
players’ strategies. As a result, the move between two states is
possible only when one player changes its strategy. However, in
real conflicts, plural players may be able to move to the same
states, and the choice such as “nuclear attack” in military con-
flicts, leads a conflict to the irreversible result, which cannot
be returned. GMCR can incorporate common and irreversible
moves into the model.
Fig. 2 shows the game on the formulation of cooperation be-
tween two players. The difference from prisoner’s dilemma in
Fig. 1 is the existence of common and irreversible moves from
the state 4 to the state 1. It is assumed that both players have
two alternatives, “collaborate” and “not collaborate” in strategic
form. To realize cooperation, both players need to take the al-
ternative “collaborate.” However, cooperation collapses even if
one player changes its alternative from “collaborate” to “not col-
laborate.” Once cooperation is collapsed by the common move,
players cannot return the same path to cooperative state directly.
They have to change their strategies one by one again.
B. Definition of Stability and Equilibrium in Two-Player
Conflict
Based on Fang et al. [3], some definitions on stability are
shown as follows. Here we assume a 2-player game. The fol-




The state is Nash stable for player if, and only if,
cannot improve its payoff by changing his own strate-
gies. In other words, .
• Sequential Stability [4]
The state is sequentially stable for player if, and only
if, for every , there exists
with . (Here, is called the sanction
for player s UI, .)
• General Metarationality (GMR)
The state is general metarational for player if, and
only if, for every , there exists
with .
We use these solution concepts also in the following robustness
analysis.
C. Extension of Graph Model for Conflict Resolution for the
Case With Incomplete Preference Information
Potential users of GMCR are players themselves, consultants
advising players, third parties analyzing conflicts, mediator,
etc. (Fang et al. [3]). Let us call such users “analysts.” In
some cases, an analyst does not have complete information on
players’ preferences. When one player is an analyst, it may not
know about its counterparts’ preferences. Consultants, third
parties, or mediator may have only limited information on all
players’ preferences.
Before presenting the GMCR with incomplete information,
we introduce a binary description for representing ordinal pref-
erence. means that player (strictly) prefers to ,
and means that player strictly or equally prefers
to . On the other hand, means that and are
indifferent for player .
Let the pattern of players’ preference orders and the set of
patterns be and , respectively. When states are strictly
ordered (there are no indifferent states), the number of each
player’s preference orders amounts to . Consequently, the
number of patterns of players’ preference orders becomes
and .
If an analyst has complete information, it can recognize ex-
actly. However, if an analyst has only limited knowledge, it only
recognizes that the pattern of preference orders is included in the
subset of . Let be the subset of representing an analyst’s
knowledge on players’ preferences. Although an analyst knows
that the true pattern of preference orders is certainly included in
the set , it does not know which is a true pattern in .
Using information set , we propose GMCR with incomplete
information. GMCR under analyst’s information set is rep-
resented by 4-tuple , where ,
, , and . When
is a singleton set, an analyst has complete information.
Here we define the sets that represent analyst’s knowledge on
preferences. Ordered sets on analyst’s information set
[ , , , and ]:
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• The state belongs to if is preferred to by
player at every pattern of preference orders in informa-
tion set ( ).
• The state belongs to if is equally preferred
to by player at every pattern of preference orders in
information set ( ).
• The state belongs to if is less preferred
to by player at every pattern of preference orders in
information set ( ).
• The state belongs to if does not belong to
either , , or . In other words,
an analyst does not know if player prefers to or not
with information set .
The product of reachable list and ordered set is defined as “or-





When is a singleton set, and
.
D. Stability in GMCR With Incomplete Information
Even if the information on players’ preferences is incomplete
for the analyst, stability analysis for some states can be carried
out. For 2-player conflict, definitions for Nash stability, sequen-
tial stability, and GMR based on analyst’s knowledge can be
shown as follows.
Nash Stability Based on Analyst’s Knowledge: The state
is Nash stable for player based on analyst’s information set if,
and only if, the following condition is satisfied:
(5)
Sequential Stability Based on Analyst’s Knowledge: The
state is sequentially stable for player based on analyst’s
knowledge if, and only if, the following condition is satisfied:
or
(6)
General Metarationality Based on Analyst’s Knowl-
edge: The state is general metarational for player based on
analyst’s knowledge if the following condition is satisfied:
or
(7)
Nash stability is decided without any information on other
player’s preference. If a player does not have any UIs, the state
is Nash stable for the player. On the other hand, sequential sta-
bility and GMR depends on the player’s knowledge on its coun-
terpart’s preference. If a player knows that its counterpart has
a UI (in sequential stability) that reduces its payoff, the player
gives up moving from the current state.
In the next section, robustness analysis that specifies the
necessary and sufficient conditions for the stability of states is
shown.
III. GENERALIZATION OF ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
A. Robustness Analysis
Stability analysis in conflict analysis decides if the corre-
sponding state is stable or not, based on the solution concepts.
However, if an analyst does not know players’ preferences, it
cannot judge the stability of the state.
In the actual situation, an analyst does not necessarily have
the complete information at the beginning of the analysis.
Therefore, when an analyst needs to know about the stability,
it has to collect information and renew its knowledge. Okada
et al. [4] proposed robustness analysis to specify the minimum
conditions that is necessary to judge the stability of the cor-
responding state. robustness analysis is a kind of an inverse
problem of stability analysis.
Okada et al. [4] proposed robustness analysis for 2-player
conflict in which the preference of one player is not known.
In this paper, we generalize the methodology to apply 2-player
conflict under arbitrary information set of an analyst. The gen-
eralized robustness analysis can be applied to the conflict where
both players’ preferences are not known. Analysts can use the
result of robustness analysis as follows.
Players: Although a player knows its own preference, it may
not have enough information on its counterpart’s preference.
Robustness analysis can provide the minimum information
guaranteeing that a state can become a resolution of a conflict.
Mediator: Mediator tries to find the state that can be ac-
cepted as a compromise by both players. The stable state has
high possibility to be accepted by players. However, in many
cases, mediator has incomplete information on both players’
preferences. If a mediator can confirm the condition for stability
that is shown by robustness analysis, it can present the state as
a proposal for agreement with conviction.
In the following parts, robustness analysis is generalized.
B. The Conditions for Stability in 2-Player Conflicts
Here we show the conditions that are necessary for the third
party to judge if the corresponding state is stable or not. Since
these conditions are specified based on the third party’s knowl-
edge, the information sets on the third party’s knowledge are
used. The sufficient condition for stability of a state is repre-
sented by some inequalities on players’ preference. We call the
set of these conditions “condition set.” In the following subsec-
tion, conditions for Nash stability, sequential stability, and GMR
are formulated.
1) The Condition for Nash Stability: The state is Nash
stable for player if the UI from state by player is empty
set [ ]. In GMCR under the information set ,
is the subset of , and is included in
(see Fig. 3). Consequently, the condition
that the state is Nash stable for player is shown as follows.
(Presumption) : For every
(8)
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Fig. 3. Relationship between sets.
The number of conditions included in a sufficient condition set
becomes . The number of sufficient condition sets for
player is one.
2) The Condition for Sequential Stability: The stake is se-
quentially stable for player if sanction exists for every state
included in . Since is the subset of , the
existence of sanction for player s movement to the state in
is necessary to guarantee sequential stability of the





Here, if , and if . or is the
condition that player does not move to the state which is known
as UI for player .
For the state in , it is not known if a state is included
in or not. If an analyst obtains information that shows
that player prefers to the state in , it needs to find
information showing existence of sanction. The flowchart for
specifying conditions is shown in Fig. 4 and in the following
inequalities.




is the condition that is not UI for player . and
are the condition for the existence of the sanction
for .
The condition for sequential stability of the state includes
one of or for every and – for every
.
3) The Condition for General Metarationality: In the case
of GMR, the condition for the existence of sanction is not nec-
essary. Therefore, we need to assume a very conservative player
when we use the solution concept of GMR.
Fig. 4. Flowchart for specifying conditions for not moving to the state in
S (k; ) (sequential stability).
Fig. 5. Flowchart for specifying conditions for not moving to the state in
S (k; ) (general metarationality).
• For every
(14)
If , can always be found.
In case of the states in , the process for checking pos-
sibility of player s move is similar to the process for sequential
stability. First, an analyst checks if player prefers to the state
in . If an analyst obtains information that shows that
player prefers to the state in , it needs to find the
information showing existence of sanction (see Fig. 5).




If , can always be found.
The sets of Nash stable states and sequentially stable state are
the subsets of general metarational states [3]. Therefore, the
conditions that the state is general metarational (14)–(16) are the
necessary conditions for other solution concepts. That implies
that the state which satisfies the conditions for Nash stability or
sequential stability is more robust than the state which only sat-
isfies the conditions for GMR.
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C. Example of Robustness Analysis
As an example, robustness analysis for the conflict shown in
Fig. 6 is carried out. Since there are four states in the conflict,
. Let us assume that an analyst’s information













Let us think about the stability of the state B. Using the con-
ditions shown in , the state B is stable if the following rela-
tionships are satisfied.




















When two conditions [(a) and (b)] exist, the state B is stable
if at least one of the two conditions is satisfied. The result of
robustness analysis shows that limited number of preference re-
lationships needs to be specified to guarantee the stability of a
state.
IV. APPLICATION OF ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
A. Planning Conflict
Environmental problem often involves conflicts between
stakeholders. For example, Fang et al. [3] discuss the Garrison
diversion unit conflict [5], which involves the governments of
the United States and Canada, the government of Manitoba,
environmentalists, etc. In the conflicts on environment, the
alternative for mediating interests on development and environ-
ment is necessary. Therefore, it is important to guarantee the
stability of a state.
In this section, the methodology of robustness analysis is
applied to the conflict on hydropower generation and a river
environment [6]–[8] (Fig. 7). There exist some reservoirs only
for hydropower generation in a river basin. For the purpose of
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Fig. 7. Effects of hydropower generation on downstream river environment.
Fig. 8. Constructing a new reservoir for maintaining environmental river flow.
efficient use of potential energy, the water stored in reservoirs
is often sent to the other reservoir directly. Bypassing water
by pipelines may reduce a large amount of water downstream.
That results in a shortage of river flow downstream. This
shortage affects ecosystems, leisure, landscapes, sightseeing,
and groundwater.
Several countermeasures (alternatives) to increase the flow
of water are available. For example, local government can con-
struct a new reservoir to obtain a storage capacity for environ-
mental flow (see Fig. 8). In this case, local government can make
a decision independently of existing user (hydropower genera-
tion). However, the resolution may result in an inefficient use of
sites. Local government may not be able to find an appropriate
site to construct an additional reservoir.
On the other hand, the power generation company may be
able to reduce the level of hydropower generation (see Fig. 9).
When this alternative is taken, the company has to generate elec-
Fig. 9. Reservoir renewal (one example).
tricity by other means (other reservoirs, thermal power genera-
tion, etc.) If the scale of hydropower generation is reduced, the
benefit to the power generation company is reduced. Therefore,
the power generation company may ask the local government to
compensate the loss. The transfer of benefit can be interpreted
as net benefit reallocation of the project.
In this case, the power generation company represents the
vested interests, while the local government represents the new
interests of the river environment. A critical difference between
them is that the power generation company (an existing user)
can continue the hydropower generation in a status quo, while
the local government cannot recover the river flow without
taking any actions.
We assume two players. One is a local government and the
other is a power generation company. In this conflict, the local
government (Player 1) represents societal needs for better river
environment. The purpose of the player is to conserve (or re-
cover) the river environment by increasing discharge from a
reservoir. We assume that the local government does not care
about the benefit of a power generation company. The purpose
of power generation company (Player 2) is to generate and sell
electricity. Player 2 hopes to maintain the current level of hy-
dropower generation. However, if it can achieve the coopera-
tion with Player 1 (local government), it may have an incentive
to change the current situation. Player 2’s incentive depends on
the net benefit which Player 2 can obtain.
Player 1 can maintain the status quo or construct a new reser-
voir by itself. These alternatives are called and , respec-
tively. Player 2 has the alternative that it stays in the status quo.
The alternative is called . Redevelopment solutions are not re-
alized if at least one player takes these strategies.
We assume the case where several types of redevelopment so-
lutions are assumed. Redevelopment solutions are represented
by the combination of the alternatives on net benefit allocation
and structural measures. This is assumed as follows.
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1) Player 1 can select the alternatives on net benefit
allocation.
2) Player 2 can select the alternatives on structural measures.
Player 1’s alternatives for redevelopment solutions ( ):
• Low payment level ( ).
• Medium payment level ( ).
• High payment level ( ).
Player 2’s alternatives for redevelopment solutions ( ):
• Using other power generation means ( ).
• Adding hydropower generation in another reservoir ( ).
• Upgrading the dam ( ).
Redevelopment solutions are represented by . The rede-
velopment solution indicates that Player 1 takes strategy
on net benefit allocation and Player 2 takes strategy on
structural measure.
In order to realize redevelopment solutions, both players
have to take the strategies compensating the loss (Player 1) and
changing the status quo (Player 2), respectively. However, if
Player 1 gives up compensating and preferred noncooperative
solution ( ), the state is moved from a cooperative solution
( ) to a noncooperative solution ( ). Similarly, if Player
2 gives up taking a structural measure for redevelopment,
the state is moved from to S. On the other hand, the
transition from to could not happen unilaterally.
All of this shows that each player can cause the collapse of
a cooperative solution unilaterally and the transition is an
irreversible move.
Figs. 10 and 11 show and in the graph model for
the planning conflict. The number of the feasible states is 20.
The collapse of cooperation is represented by irreversible and
common moves.
B. Information Structure in Planning Conflict
In this planning conflict, we assume the following informa-
tion structure:
(30)
Equation (30) reveals that temporary states are not preferred
to the solutions which could become final solutions. We call
, , and “real solutions.” This information enables
us to classify states into two groups.
Fig. 10. Player 1’s feasible transition between states.
Fig. 11. Player 2’s feasible transition between states.
On the other hand, it is also obvious that both players prefer
the states in which its own payment is lower. That is
means Player 2s alternative).
(31)
Using this information, we can make the order between
these states. Table I shows the ordered sets ,
, and in the planning conflict.
C. Players’ Preferences and Social Efficiency
As regards players’ preferences, the following relationships
exist.
• If , Player 1 prefers the redevelopment solu-
tion to constructing a new reservoir by themselves.
• If , Player 1 prefers constructing a new
reservoir by themselves to the redevelopment solution
.
• If , Player 1 prefers the redevelopment solu-
tion to maintaining the status quo.
• If , Player 1 prefers maintaining the status
quo to the redevelopment solution .
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TABLE I
PLAYER 1S ORDERED SETS IN THE PLANNING CONFLICT [ (R A ; ),  (R A ; ), AND  (R A ; )]
• If , Player 2 prefers the redevelopment so-
lution to maintaining the status quo.
• If , Player 2 prefers maintaining the status
quo to the redevelopment solution .
On the other hand, redevelopment solution is better than
the noncooperative solution for the community consisting of
both players if the following conditions (32) are satisfied:
(32)
If (32) is satisfied, redevelopment option should be im-
plemented from the viewpoint of a community, because
and are Pareto-dominated by . However, in a planning
conflict, if the profit obtained by a player can be improved by
moving from to another states, the player does not have
an incentive to stay at .
D. Application Results
Table II shows the conditions that state (Player 1
pays the cost at medium level and uses other power generation
means) is Nash stable or sequentially stable for Player 1 (A)
and Player 2 (B). The inequalities in Table II are the condition
sets which the planning authority has to detect to confirm that
is a stable renewal alternative.
From , Player 1 can always move to low payment
level. In other words, it is common knowledge that Player 1
has a UI from to . Therefore, it is obvious that
is not Nash stable for Player 1.
From Table II, we can obtain the following properties.
1) is stable for Player 1 if a) Player 1 prefers
to and , and b) Player 2 can improve
its payoff from by changing its option from
(using other power generation means) to (adding
hydropower generation in other reservoir) or (up-
grading the dam) and Player 1 prefers to the
resulting state ( or ) (b-1) or Player 2
prefers or to (b-2).
If is stable for Player 1, (a) and (b-1) or (a) and
(b-2) must be satisfied.
2) is stable for Player 2 if Player 2 prefers
to or (c), and Player 2 prefers
to or (d), Player 2 prefers to
or (e-1) or Player 1 prefers or
to or (e-2).
If is stable for Player 2, (c) and (d) , (c) and (e-1) ,
or (c) and (e-2) must be satisfied.
Sequential stability needs player’s ability to forecast coun-
terpart’s sanction. In order to lead players to the stable state,
the planning authority needs not only to inspect players’ pref-
erences, but also to hold the information jointly with players.
That is, specified preference order should be made common
knowledge.
E. Case With More Information
Now we assume another situation where the planning au-
thority can obtain additional information on players’ preference.
In this case, the number of conditions included in sufficient con-
dition sets can be reduced. Table III shows sufficient condition
sets for s stability with following additional information.
1) Player 1 prefers arbitrary cooperative solution (reservoir




2) Player 2 always prefers the structural measure
(using other power generation means) to (adding
hydropower generation in another reservoir) and prefers
(upgrading the dam) to
and
(34)
In this case, is the second largest payment for Player 1 and
is the second preferred alternative for Player 2. can
be regarded as the compromising alternative.
Table III shows that s stability depends on the trade-
offs of both players’ preference between structural alternatives
and payment. That is, the critical conditions for stability are that
both players prefer to .
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed the application of robustness anal-
ysis to the conflicts where the information on players’ prefer-
ences is incomplete. Robustness analysis is generalized to apply
the situation where preferences of both players are not known
by the third party. Then, the methodology was applied to the
planning conflict between two players representing hydropower
generation and river environment.
If the third party has only incomplete information on
preferences of stakeholders, it is necessary to use a different
methodology for coordination, which is different from one
where complete information is available. The robustness
analysis can become a useful approach to detect the stable and
better alternatives.
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TABLE II
(a) RESULTS OF ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS (STATE R A ).




(a) RESULTS OF ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS (STATE R A ) WITH ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION. (b) CONDITION SETS FOR PLAYER 1S STABILITY.
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